FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 2 2 2018

## **CONFIDENTIAL**

## BEFORE THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

David J. Smith Clerk

## Judicial Complaint No. 11-17-90024

IN THE MATTER OF A COMPLAINT FILED BY
IN RE: The Complaint of against, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of, under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Chapter 16 of Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364.
ORDER
has filed this Complaint against United States Bankruptcy Judge under Chapter 16 of Title 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) and the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States (JCDR).
As an initial matter, after filed his Complaint, he filed three supplemental statements. The filing of the supplemental statements is permitted. See 11th Cir. JCDR 6.7.
I Allegations Against Judge
In 2009 first appeared before as a party in bankruptcy proceedings involving a nursing home that owned. Some of the allegations in Complaint arise from those proceedings. Other allegations concern proceedings before Judge where was not a party alleges that Judge:
(1) Lied about the extent of his earlier representation of a party in bankruptcy cases, failed to recuse himself, and had ex parte contact with one of his former law partners;
(2) Issued an opinion in which he "lied about the 'facts' regarding";
(3) Improperly found and others in contempt and ordered that they be arrested by the marshals and incarcerated without due process and without district court review;

(4) Made allegedly inappropriate comments in open court —
a) at one hearing referred to bankruptcy as entering where you can come into the court, but the judge says when you can get out;
b) at another hearing called the father of a debtor "a despicable human being, the lowest form of life"; and
c) at another hearing called an attorney an "asshole."
This Order will begin by discussing the bankruptcy proceedings in which  was a party. That discussion first addresses the nursing home's Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and then a related adversary proceeding that the nursing home filed against After recounting that background information, it addresses allegations about Judge conduct in those proceedings and in other proceedings where was not a party.
A. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings
The record shows that in February 2009, a nursing home that owned, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. ( Bankruptcy Case No). The nursing home filed a motion for turnover of property arising from its dispute with two companies managed by At a February 2009 hearing before Judge on the turnover motion, counsel for those two companies mentioned that before he became a judge, Attorney had represented Counsel told the court: "[S]ome years ago Mr was referred to a very good attorney in by the name of, and he represented that gentleman in ar attempt to purchase a nursing home, and I understand it was a day or two, or something like that, and we wanted to bring it to your Honor's attention." Judge stated "Thank you for mentioning it. Had you not, I would have."  About that earlier representation and presumably the question of recusal, Judge stated that it was counsel for the nursing home's "call." Counsel for the nursing home responded, "As long as you don't personally feel a conflict, we don't have a problem with it." Judge stated, "Okay. It's been a while, and I think that the representation was sufficiently attenuated that if everybody is comfortable with it,
let's proceed." <sup>2</sup> At that point, no one objected. The parties later reached a settlement
See .

agreement. In March 2009 Judge entered an order approving that settlement agreement and dismissing the action without prejudice.
In August 2009 again filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, and signed the petition as the "Managing Member." ( Bankruptcy Case No). The case was later assigned to Judge of the law firm (), filed a notice of appearance as counsel for a creditor. On January 7, 2010, Judge entered an order granting the nursing home's motion for approval of a settlement agreement between certain parties and finding that had breached the first settlement agreement in several ways, including "by attempting to embezzle \$ of the [nursing home's] funds." appealed the order, but the district court later dismissed that appeal for failure to prosecute. ( Case No).
In March 2010, as a creditor and "former debtor-in-possession," filed a pro se motion seeking Judge recusal based on his earlier involvement with and others. He also sought to vacate the order approving the settlement agreement, which had been entered a year before asserted that he believed that Judge had committed perjury or was incompetent. In an attached declaration, stated that Judge, when he was an attorney in private practice, had represented in another matter for three years — not just "a day or two" — and that Judge had been partners with at the law firm.
Judge denied the motion to recuse, finding that he had not misrepresented the scope of his earlier representation and that had consulted him over a period of a few days on another unrelated matter. Judge stated, "In hindsight, it would have been helpful for me to clarify [counsel's] 'day or two, or something like that' comment on the record." In any event, he explained: "Had any interested party voiced its concerns about the potential conflict, I would have seriously considered recusal at that time. But I did not feel partial, and the parties expressed their views on the record. They were not concerned, I was not concerned, and we proceeded."
filed a motion to reconsider, which Judge denied, noting that his "prior representation in unrelated matters has been on the record since the beginning of this case." In January 2011 filed a motion seeking Judge recusal in light of his actions and his decision not to recuse in a different case in which was not a party. Judge construed the motion as a second motion for
reconsideration and ordered it stricken. After various additional proceedings, in November 2015 Judge entered a final decree and closed the case.  3 Judge had been a shareholder at the firm before he was appointed to be a judge

## B. The Nursing Home's Adversary Proceeding against

While the n	tursing home's chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings were ongoing before
Judge, (	on January 29, 2010, the nursing home, through counsel, filed an
adversary proceed	ing against and two companies, seeking to recover what it
contended were er	nbezzled funds belonging to the estate Bankruptcy Case
No). Is	n late March 2010, Judge granted a motion for entry of final
default judgment a	against the defendants. In addition to awarding monetary damages, the
order permanently	enjoined from contacting, and others,
with certain excep	tions, in light of the threatening tone of earlier emails to
	eys involved in the case. The order provided that if violated
the injunction, he	would be required to show cause at a hearing why he should not be
held in contempt,	and if he failed to appear, the court would direct the United States
Marshals Office to	take him into custody in order to ensure that he appear at the hearing.
for a hearing, comby ema by ema wife an directed the Marsi	, 2010,, as counsel for a creditor, filed an emergency motion tending that had violated the injunction by contacting il and telephone and that had harassed and threatened d child. The same day, Judge granted the motion and hals Service to apprehend The order quoted an email sent to had been filed with the motion. It stated in part:
be worst [s	when you come out of hiding Tuesday bight [sic] your lives will ic] than mine.  not realize it, but they end tomorrow at 1:00.
Tell	"thanks" for his testimony.
Denying y and	our signature on a Therapy contract, when notarized it, is in the deposition [sic], was classic.
And the D	OJ had no idea about these "usery" loans you make to non Jews
"the world	is anti-Semitic, so Jews should steal from eveyone [sic]?"
You believ	e that?
I'm not an	ti semitic
I just hate	vou

Judge	found that it was more likely than not that	had sent that email.
	luded that the email threatened to murder	
	hreat was credible.	
Service had i hearing was see behalf and age cowith [ nothing — nothin	oril 19, 2010, Judge entered an order sometimed him that was apprehended on set for April 20, 2010. At that hearing, an attorned greed from the outset that a was warrand unsel stated that everyone agreed that "we need to actual threat to their lives, which is clearly a reaccourt stated:	n April 17, 2010, and a ey appeared on nted and necessary. to find out what's going on are satisfied that there's
need of some of And I am give co	to make arrangements with the marshals for his so that I can get some testime to make a testime to give it as to what improve the custody of th	ony before me from is. of the marshals until I ion is. natter involved civil or ed to be satiated." Judge
, ex	xplaining:  try to figure out how we can remediate this  ng with it in either a purely criminal, or purely civ	problem rather than
what'	s going on, then it would be possible for me to s that you're suggesting.	hat this is about, and consider the kinds of
	. 4 . 10 . 10 . 11 . 4	ceive a while in
Judgecustody.	entered an order directing that rec	<del></del> -

entered an order directing the Marshals Service to transfer to the to be held pending further order of the court and directing that he receive a
At a May 5, 2010 hearing, a testified that he believed presented no risk of harm to himself or to anyone else involved in the case. Judge stated that he would order that be released from custody with the understanding that he would voluntarily enroll in a treatment program. The same day, Judge entered an order directing the Marshals Service to release In October 2011 the adversary proceeding was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
C. Appeal to the District Court in the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings
In the chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, the nursing home appealed Judge final decree to the district court, through counsel, filed a brief contending, among other things, that Judge: (1) lacked jurisdiction to issue the final decree order; (2) had failed to disclose his relationship with and others involved in the litigation; (3) had an ex parte communication with; and (4) should have recused himself from the case.
Later filed a "Verified Motion for an Order Clarifying and/or Certification to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as to Non-Article III Judge's Jurisdiction to Order Arrest and Incarceration by the U.S. Marshals Without <i>Prior</i> Article III Judge's Review." In that motion, he contended that he had a "genuine fear" that Judge would "illegally attempt to incarcerate" him, and he stated that he believed that Judge had issued at least ten orders directing the Marshals Service to arrest and incarcerate people without seeking prior review from the district court filed a supplement to that motion arguing that Judge had recently issued another order directing the Marshals Service to apprehend someone without prior review by an Article III judge.
On March 24, 2017, District Judge entered an order denying appeal and his motions. Judge found that: (1) could not reopen issues that he had failed to prosecute in his earlier appeal; (2) the bankruptcy court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and it had applied the correct legal standards; (3) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion with regard to any discretionary rulings; (4) none of the circumstances in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) requiring a judge to disqualify himself was present in the case; (5) the principle of equitable mootness supported denial of the appeal; and (6) sought an "unconstitutional advisory
At the April 26 hearing, told the court: "" Later, Judge explained, "" Judge replied,"  " And at the end of the hearing, Judge told, ""

opinion" from the court regarding Judge possible future conduct, and the court declined to issue such an opinion.
appealed the district court's order, and that appeal is pending before this Court, No Some of the issues that has raised in that appeal overlap with some of the allegations in his Complaint, and to the extent that he is challenging the correctness of Judge rulings, including a decision not to recuse, that challenge may be addressed as a merits-related issue in that appeal. See JCDR 3(h)(3)(A) (providing that cognizable misconduct does not include "an allegation that is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling" and stating that "[a]n allegation that calls into question the correctness of a judge's ruling, including a failure to recuse, without more, is merits-related").
II. Allegations about Recusal, Ex Parte Contact, and Fact Findings in an Opinion
generally contends that, because of Judge past connections to, he should have recused himself from the bankruptcy cases involving and He asserts that Judge lied about the scope of his earlier representation of as a practicing lawyer. He also alleges that Judge engaged in ex parte contact with, who is his former law partner, and other attorneys with, which is his former law firm. He asserts that Judge should have recused himself from cases in which or any lawyer from appeared as counsel. Additionally, he complains that Judge issued an opinion in which he "lied about the 'facts' regarding"
A. Allegations about Recusal
contends that Judgeshould have recused himself from the bankruptcy proceedings in which and were parties. He alleges that Judge "worked for his client,, two.years AFTER becoming a U.S. Bankruptcy Judge IN THE SAME CASE, and to this day, has refused to admit it." He asserts that Judge "lied" and said it was a one or two day representation and called it "consulting." states that Judge was listed as a witness in a case involving and that a sitting bankruptcy judge being paid as a witness "appears to be illegal."
In his first supplemental statement, reiterates his allegations about Judge decision not to recuse himself. He states that after he filed his initial Complaint, "two Orders have been issued that support" Judge, and that he is adding those orders to his Complaint "so that [he] cannot be accused of withholding information that does not support [his] Complaint."

This is not the first time has made those allegations in a judicial
misconduct complaint. He filed a similar complaint against Judge in 2010. In
that complaint, he alleged that Judge had exhibited a disability and had "lied"
at the February 2009 hearing on the motion for turnover of property in the main
bankruptcy case, No He asserted that Judge lied when
he did not dispute the statement that he had represented in a previous matter
for only one or two days, when in fact the representation had lasted from February 2003
until February 2006. also discussed his belief that Judge suffered
from a "disability" because he "forgot" about the following: the scope of his
representation of, his testimony as a witness for regarding a dispute
over an "unpaid legal bill," and his connection to
In an order dated November 29, 2010, then-Chief Judge dismissed that
judicial misconduct complaint as merits-related or based on allegations lacking sufficient
evidence did not file a petition for review, and the matter was closed in
February 2011.
When a current complaint repeats the allegations contained in a previously
dismissed one, it is appropriate to dismiss those repeated allegations and address only
allegations that have not previously been considered. See JCDR 11(c)(2). With respect to
allegations that Judge lied about his representation of in a
previous matter and should have recused himself from the bankruptcy proceedings in
which was involved, those allegations have already been considered in
connection with earlier complaint. See id has presented no
material information that was not previously considered. See id. Furthermore, the
allegations about recusal are "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural
ruling" because "[a]n allegation that calls into question the correctness of a judge's
ruling, including a failure to recuse, without more, is merits-related." JCDR 3(h)(3)(A).
As a result, that part of the Complaint is <b>DISMISSED</b> . See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii);
JCDR 11(c)(1)(B).
B. Allegations about Ex Parte Contact
alleges that Judge had ex parte contact with, his
former law portner in a case in which was not a party, resulting in an older
being incorrectly reversed on anneal before this Court. In his first supplemental
statement reiterates that allegation. He quotes documents that were filed with
the hardware court orders and excernts from transcripts. He asserts that Judge
was a witness for in one case while presiding over another case in
which was annearing as counsel. In a footnote, states, I ou would
assume that must have communicated with" Judge about the
settlement of a case.

In his second supplemental statement, states that he has discovered a
transcript from August 2008 that is relevant to his allegation that Judge
engaged in ex parte contact with his former law firm, He states that the
transcript demonstrates that Judge former law firm was participating in a case
in which Judge was appearing as a "witness" on the same day that the firm was
appearing in a different case over which Judge was presiding.
appearing in a different case over windir range was presented.
One of the transcripts that submitted with his second supplemental statement shows that attorney appeared at a hearing before Judge on August 25, 2008, in a bankruptcy case. At that hearing, stated that then-
attorney had been the first attorney on the case before he became a judge. She
discussed a motion to dismiss that he had filed in the case and arguments that had been
made earlier in the case. The transcript does not indicate that Judge appeared
as a witness or appeared before the court in any capacity after he became a judge. The
other transcript that submitted shows that on the same day, August 25, 2008,
Judge held a hearing in a different and completely unrelated case, and a
different lawyer from the firm appeared in that case and argued before Judge
The allegation that Judge had inappropriate ex parte contact with or his former law firm and that the ex parte contact caused this Court to incorrectly reverse a judgment on appeal lacks "sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred or that a disability exists," JCDR 11(c)(1)(D), and is directly related to the merits of a decision, id. 11(c)(1)(B). As a result, that part of the complaint is DISMISSED. See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii); JCDR 11(c)(1)(B) & (D).
To the extent is alleging that Judge engaged in misconduct in deciding not to recuse himself from cases in which or his former law firm of was participating, that allegation is directly related to the merits of Judge decisions or procedural rulings, see JCDR 11(c)(1)(B); id. 3(h)(3)(A) (providing that "[a]n allegation that calls into question the correctness of a judge's ruling, including a failure to recuse, without more, is merits-related"). As a result, that part of the complaint is also DISMISSED. See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii); JCDR 11(c)(1)(B).
C. Allegations about Fact Findings in an Opinion
alleges that Judge "published' an Opinion where he lied about the 'facts' regarding", specifically by stating that: (1) "was 'found' to have embezzled money from the bankruptcy estate, without notice of a hearing, a hearing, etc."; and (2) "threatened violence' against [Judge] former law partner,, other unknown lawyers at his former law firm,, and also against their CHILDREN."

allegation that Judge _	issued an opinion in which he "lied"
about facts concerning is direct	ctly related to the merits of Judge
decisions or procedural rulings. The alle	egation challenges the substance of the fact
	se it is "directly related to the merits of a decision
or procedural ruling," JCDR 11(c)(1)(B)	, that part of the Complaint is DISMISSED. See
28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii); JCDR 11(c	
III. Allegation that Judge Im	properly Found People in Contempt and Ordered
that They Be Arrested 1	by the Marshals and Incarcerated
·	
alleges that Judge	"[r]efuses to follow that rule that non-
Article III Judges must ask for review of	f an Article III Judge before having the U.S.
Marshals arrest and incarcerate anyone.'	' He notes that, "[a]s late as two months ago,"
Judge ordered "a father and a	son arrested." He states that Judge
"finds' people in Contempt of Court wi	thout any due process, including notice, a
	d against them, etc." He contends that "[t]his
denies the person the ability to get bail of	or bond or a public Defender." He later states that
Judge "has a five year old 'ar	rest warrant" outstanding in a bankruptcy case in
which is not a party. He also	contends that Judge "ignored" the
orders of district and circuit judges.	<u> </u>
, ,	
He attached documents to his con	mplaint, including documents filed and orders
	aper articles that discuss Judge rulings.
In his first supplemental statement, ne c	omplains about Judge denial of his pro
se motion that sought to "clarity" or "ce	ertify" to this Court that Judge could
not arrest people without prior Article	I Judge review. He asserts that Judge
found that his motion was "unconstitut	ional" but that it is unconstitutional to put people
in jail illegally. He alleges that Judge _	"never charges anyone with a crime,
	portunity for bail or the right to a Public
Defender."	
A. <u>Criminal ar</u>	nd Civil Contempt Authority
Courts' powers of criminal contr	empt are set out in 18 U.S.C. § 401, which
provides:	
P1011900.	
A court of the United States	shall have power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, or both, at its dis	cretion, such contempt of its authority, and

(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;

none other, as--

- (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
- (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.

18 U.S.C. § 401; see also United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that criminal contempt "is a sui generis offense and that it is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor").

"Civil contempt power is inherent in bankruptcy courts since all courts have authority to enforce compliance with their lawful orders." In re Ocean Warrior, Inc., 835 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). "Distinct from the bankruptcy courts' inherent contempt powers, 11 U.S.C. § 105 creates the bankruptcy courts' statutory civil contempt power." Id. Section 105(a) provides in part, "The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). "Civil penalties must either be compensatory or designed to coerce compliance." In re Ocean Warrior, Inc., 835 F.3d at 1317 (quotation marks omitted).

This Court has noted that "[i]n addition to the traditional sanctions for coercing compliance with an injunction—incarceration or financial penalty . . . —a bankruptcy court may issue orders to obviate conduct that stands to frustrate administration of the Bankruptcy Code . . . ." Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 966 (11th Cir. 2012). We have also stated, "A Bankruptcy Court has the power to imprison a debtor for contempt of court when the debtor fails to comply with a Turn Over Order." In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002). In that case, this Court also reminded the district and bankruptcy courts "that civil contempt sanctions are intended to coerce compliance with a court order," and "[w]hen civil contempt sanctions lose their coercive effect, they become punitive and violate the contemnor's due process rights." Id. at 1300 (quotation marks omitted).

This Court has noted that the "line between civil and criminal contempt sanctions is not always clear . . . ." In re McLean, 794 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). "Sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained." Id. (quotation marks omitted). "Punitive sanctions, by contrast, take the form of a fixed fine and have no practical purpose other than punishment; it is immaterial to a court imposing such sanctions that a contemnor might be fully in compliance with the order in question at the time the sanctions are imposed." Id.

This Court has stated that in determining whether a sanction for contempt is coercive rather than punitive, it must ask: "(1) whether the award directly serves the complainant rather than the public interest and (2) whether the contemnor may control the extent of the award." <u>Id.</u> (quotation marks omitted). While due process requires only "skeletal" protections in civil contempt proceedings, "criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense, and so due process requires more stringent protections in criminal contempt proceedings." <u>Id.</u> at 1324 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

In his Complaint and first supplemental statement discusses a number of cases in which Judge held people in contempt. He also attaches various documents related to those cases alleges that Judge engaged in misconduct in two cases involving criminal contempt and in several cases involving civil contempt.
B. <u>Incarceration for Criminal Contempt</u>
The record establishes that in a bankruptcy case involving the family,  Judge held in criminal contempt and ordered her incarceration  before any district court review of the matter. The district court later concluded that the  bankruptcy court had exceeded its authority.
In connection with multiple bankruptcy petitions that had been filed by the family, Judge held a hearing on April 22, 2011. At that hearing, he found that was in criminal contempt, he continued the hearing until May 4, 2011, and he remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshals for the intervening time, which was about two weeks.
On May 4, 2011, Judge findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the criminal contempt matter were filed with the district court (the case was before Judge, who was then a district judge). Judge found that had: repeatedly disregarded bankruptcy court orders, filed bankruptcy petitions in violation of court orders, lied to the court in written filings and testimony under oath at the April 22 hearing, misleadingly filed bankruptcy petitions in her parents' names, and filed those petitions with the sole intent of forestalling foreclosure proceedings.
Two days later on May 6, Judge held a status conference with attorney and an Assistant United States Attorney. After the conference, he immediately ordered released from custody based on his "preliminary research," which indicated that Judge had exceeded his authority by ordering incorrectation for criminal contempt without district court intervention or review.

On October 13, 2011, Judge entered an order concluding that a
bankruptcy court does not have the authority to hold a person in criminal contempt prior
to district court review. The order explained that "the bankruptcy court issued its
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law after it had incarcerated as a
punitive sanction for criminal contempt and kept her in custody without any ending date
in sight," and "[t]hat course of action put the proverbial cart before the horse." Judge
declined to issue an order directing to show cause why she should
not be held in criminal contempt and stated that the U.S. Attorney's Office was "of
course free to determine on its own whether criminal contempt proceedings against
should be initiated based on the conduct described by the bankruptcy court."
Because of his view that Judge did not have the authority to incarcerate
without district court approval, he rejected Judge findings of facts
and conclusions of law as a nullity.
C. <u>Incarceration for Criminal Contempt</u>
In another bankruptcy case Judgeentered an order on January 17, 2013 finding thathad acted in bad faith and had engaged in civil and criminal contempt in open court. The order stated that "[a]lthough this Court believes that it has the authority to impose sanctions for criminal contempt, this Court is not organized in a manner which would permit the orderly imposition or administration of such sanctions." The order explained: "Neither the United States Attorney, who prosecutes criminal contempt actions in the District Court, nor the Public Defender, normally appear in Bankruptcy Court. Nor is this Court in a position to direct the administration of psychological evaluations which appear to be appropriate under the facts presented here."  The order went on to state: " was taken into custody by the United States Marshal this morning in order to further prevent contemptuous conduct in open court and to preserve the safety and decorum of the courtroom. He remains in custody."  Judge ordered "remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal pending further order of the court." The order recommended (1) that the district court refer the matter to the U.S. Attorney for possible prosecution for criminal contempt, (2) that be given a psychological evaluation, and (3) that the district court impose sanctions.
The next day, on January 18, 2013, a hearing was held before a magistrate judge, and was released after promising that he would appear (either in person or by telephone) at a hearing on January 30. At that hearing, appeared by telephone, and the government stated that it did not intend to pursue charges against him.  Even though was no longer in custody and the government had stated that it did not intend to pursue charges against him, on May 20, 2013, Judge issued an order "declin[ing] to take further action with respect to," and "affirm[ing]

holding in criminal contempt.	, ankrupicy Court exceeded its authority in
court the independent authority to punish order reiterated Judge observations do not have that authority and oth existence of that authority. As for bindical held that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) permits barn necessary or appropriate to carry out the dealt with monetary sanctions instead of	quoted Judge October 2011 order in a no statute or rule expressly gives a bankruptcy a criminal contempt through incarceration. The tion that some circuits have held that bankruptcy er circuits have expressed doubt about the ng authority, the order noted that this Court has kruptcy courts to issue punitive orders as provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, but that case incarceration. See In re Jove Eng'g, Inc., 92 declined to impose any further ast
challenge the correctness of two decisions on the merits by district judges. Apart for orders, the other contempt orders that and were issued to coerce compliance we the scope of a bankruptcy court's author Inc., 835 F.3d at 1316. The allegations connection with his findings of contemp are "directly related to the merits of a decision of the connection with his findings of contemps."	and contempt orders  as that have already been reviewed and addressed om the and contempt  complains about involve civil contempt  th court orders. Civil contempt orders are within  ty. See 11 U.S.C. § 105; In re Ocean Warrior,  that Judge engaged in misconduct in  and orders that individuals be held in custody  cision or procedural ruling." JCDR 11(c)(1)(B).  and of the
D	Incarceration
adversary proceeding arising from the new proceedings, the record indicates that the As this order has discussed, the record seem and harassing and threatening that many had sent an email threatening apprehend Judge Service had informed him that they had	ere was no finding of criminal or civil contempt. hows that an emergency motion alleged that court's injunction by contacting a party in the case and his family. Judge found that murder, and he ordered the U.S. Marshals to later entered an order stating that the Marshals in custody, and the order set a hearing
lawsuit he filed against Judge on	attached a copy of the complaint from the February 28, 2018. The complaint asserts claims of infliction of emotional distress, and bankruptcy

for the next day. At the hearing counsel agreed from the outset that a
was warranted and necessary. At the next hearing, six days later, the parties,
including himself, discussed what the next steps should be
requested a, and one was ordered.
Nine days later, a testified that he had evaluated and believed that he was not a risk to himself or others was released and agreed to seek immediately.
At no time during those proceedings did or his counsel seek review by the district court, even though now, nearly eight years later and in the form of a complaint about judicial misconduct, challenges the merits of Judge decisions and rulings in those proceedings. Because allegations that Judge engaged in misconduct when he ordered detained by the U.S. Marshals are "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling," JCDR 11(c)(1)(B), under 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) and Rule 11(c)(1)(B), that part of the Complaint is also <b>DISMISSED</b> .
IV. Allegations About Comments Made in Open Court
alleges that Judge made inappropriate comments in open court.  He asserts that Judge (1) at one hearing referred to bankruptcy as entering where you can come into the court, but Judge says when you can get out; (2) at another hearing called the father of a debtor "a despicable human being, the lowest form of life"; and (3) at another hearing called an attorney an "asshole."
A. The "Comment
asserts that in a bankruptcy case in which he was not a party, Judgecompared bankruptcy to A transcriptattached to his Complaint contains the excerpt from a hearing in whichcomment was made. It arose in the context of a procedurally complex case in whichclaimed that she was entitled to control the substantial assets in the estate of her deceased aunt and uncle, and, who founded the In addition to litigation in other courts, on February 23, 2011, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition, and the case was assigned to Judge He converted the case to Chapter 7, and after that, tried to withdraw her bankruptcy petition. In defiance of court orders, failed to appear in court and at a required meeting of creditors.
, a non-attorney who claimed to be close friend and "lawful representative," attempted to seek a stay and submitted other filings in the case.  Following various proceedings, — who had never appeared or produced any court-ordered documents — was held in contempt. The Trustee filed a motion to hold

in contempt, and Judge held a show cause hearing on that motion on
November 1, 2011. A transcript from that hearing shows that Judge stated:
theory, apparently, is that having filed a voluntary petition, she can file a voluntary dismissal. I think all of us in this room know that that ain't so, and that the Bankruptcy Court is, in that regard, more like, which actually is an apt analogy in this case.
You can get in, but you only get out when I say you can get out, and until cooperates, she is not getting out of this bankruptcy proceeding.
The context establishes that comment was simply a metaphorical way to describe the nature of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, which unlike a Chapter 13 case, cannot be voluntarily dismissed without the bankruptcy court's approval. The allegation that comment was inappropriate is unpersuasive. It did not constitute misconduct, and as a result, that part of the Complaint is <b>DISMISSED</b> . See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii); JCDR 11(c)(1)(D).
B. The "Despicable Human Being" Comment and the "Asshole" Comment
complains that Judge called the father of a debtor "a despicable human being, the lowest form of life" and expressed regret that the son "has to deal" with the father attached to his Complaint a transcript showing that the comment was made at a hearing.
The case in which the comment was made involved a debtor whom Judge  had held in civil contempt for failure to appear and failure to produce  documents. The marshals brought the debtor before the court, and after hearing his testimony, Judge determined that the debtor's father had coerced the young man into filing a bankruptcy petition in an attempt to thwart the foreclosure proceedings on the father's home.
At a later hearing where the father had been ordered to appear, Judge expressed his view that the son's filing of a bankruptcy petition "had been instigated, and perhaps enforced by his father." He stated: "There is no reason for the [son] to have a bankruptcy on his record as a result of coercive actions by his father and a \$350 credit card bill. That's absurd." The hearing transcript shows that Judge questioned the father about whether he had coerced his son to file for bankruptcy. Judge also asked about bankruptcies that the father himself had filed. Then Judge said, "I think you're lying to me." He went on to say: "I think you are the lowest form of life for putting your son through this. You are a despicable human being, and you can go through life either believing that or not. It is certainly my view that you are, and I regret

very much that your son has to deal with you." Judge stated that he was dismissing the son's bankruptcy case and expunging it.
In addition to those comments, also complains about a comment that Judge made in an unrelated case to an attorney who had filed a motion seeking to sanction a younger attorney. In harsh terms, Judge warned the more experienced attorney that if he continued to engage in sharp practice, he would get a bad reputation among other lawyers. A transcript attached to his Complaint shows this exchange between Judge and that attorney:
THE COURT: — [I]f you do this kind of stuff in practice, you're going to get a reputation as a real asshole. Don't do it.
And I use that word in the sense that it was used by the California philosopher Aaron James, who wrote the book "Assholes: A Theory," which was published in 2012. It distinguishes between assholes and regular kinds of jerks, and whichever one of those you are, whether it is a different category of jerk, or if I was correct in identifying you as an asshole, then sobeit. It's one or the other. Don't do it anymore.
Thank you.
[ATTORNEY]: I apologize to the Court, your Honor.
complains that the comments to the father of the debtor and to the attorney whom Judge thought had engaged in sharp practice constitute misconduct. The rules governing judicial conduct define "[c]ognizable misconduct" as "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts." JCDR 3(h)(1). Misconduct includes "treating litigants, attorneys, or others in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner." <u>Id.</u> 3(h)(1)(D).
Rule 11(a) requires the chief judge to review complaints of judicial misconduct or disability and determine what action should be taken on them, and one permissible course

Rule 11(a) requires the chief judge to review complaints of judicial misconduct or disability and determine what action should be taken on them, and one permissible course of action is to conduct a limited inquiry. See JCDR 11(a) & (b). In conducting a limited inquiry, the chief judge "may communicate orally or in writing with the complainant, the subject judge, and any others who may have knowledge of the matter, and may obtain and review transcripts and other relevant documents." JCDR 11(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 352(a).

In conducting that inquiry, the chief judge "must not determine any reasonably disputed issue." JCDR 11(b). In the present matter, the transcripts indisputably show the comments and that they were made in open court. Because the comments could be viewed as evidence of a judge "treating litigants, attorneys, or others in a demonstrably

allegations. See id. 11(b).
In conducting that inquiry, former Chief Judge and I met with Judge and discussed the matter with him. He expressed sincere remorse about having made the comments and acknowledged that they could be viewed as egregious and hostile. After we discussed the matter, Judge decided to take appropriate voluntary corrective action in order to acknowledge and remedy the problems the Complaint raised regarding inappropriate statements. See JCDR 11(d)(2).
Rule 11(d) provides in part, "The chief judge may conclude a complaint proceeding in whole or in part if the chief judge determines that the subject judge hat taken appropriate voluntary corrective action that acknowledges and remedies the problems raised by the complaint." JCDR 11(d)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(2). Wi respect to this rule, the "Commentary on Rule 11" instructs that "action taken after a complaint is filed is 'appropriate' when it acknowledges and remedies the problem raise by the complaint." JCDR 11 cmt. The Commentary explains:
Because the Act deals with the conduct of judges, the emphasis is on correction of the judicial conduct that was the subject of the complaint. Terminating a complaint based on corrective action is premised on the implicit understanding that voluntary self-correction or redress of misconduct or a disability is preferable to sanctions. The chief judge may facilitate this process by giving the subject judge an objective view of the appearance of the judicial conduct in question and by suggesting appropriate corrective measures.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Commentary notes that "'[c]orrective action' must be voluntary action taken by the subject judge." <u>Id.</u> It explains:
Where a subject judge's conduct has resulted in identifiable, particularized harm to the complainant or another individual, appropriate corrective action should include steps taken by that judge to acknowledge and redress the harm, if possible, such as by an apology, recusal from a case, or a pledge to refrain from similar conduct in the future. While the Act is generally
orally or in writing with the subject judge, and any others who have knowledge of the matter." JCDR 11(b). When was serving as chief judge in, Judge ruled of a complaint filed against Judge, which raised some of the same allegation as the present complaint. As a result Judge had "knowledge of the matter" that mad his participation in the meeting with Judge appropriate and helpful. See id.

forward-looking, any corrective action should, to the extent possible, serve to correct a specific harm to an individual, if such harm can reasonably be remedied. In some cases, corrective action may not be "appropriate" to justify conclusion of a complaint unless the complainant or other individual harmed is meaningfully apprised of the nature of the corrective action in the chief judge's order, in a direct communication from the subject judge, or otherwise.

Id. (citations omitted). In light of that guidance, Judge decided to write letters of apology to the two people to whom the harsh comments were directed. In the letters, Judge stated that he sincerely apologized for his "abusive words and tone." H sent the letters to the addresses that the court had on file for those two people.
He also sent me copies of the letters along with a cover letter to me, pledging to refrain in the future from any conduct or comments that treat attorneys or litigants in an egregious or hostile manner. He admitted his error and stated that he will do his best in the future to give no one cause to question his judicial temperament. He is aware of the potential consequences if he does not keep that pledge. Judge also stated that in light of these proceedings, if any appeal pending in this Court should be remanded to the bankruptcy court, or if any other matter involving appears on his docket, he will recuse himself from the case.
To the extent the Complaint concerns Judge inappropriate statements, Judge "has taken appropriate voluntary corrective action that acknowledges and remedies the problems raised by the complaint." JCDR 11(d)(2). As a result, that part of the Complaint is CONCLUDED. See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(2); JCDR 11(d)(2).
Schief Judge